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Abstract
In this paper, we study the robustness of state-of-the-
art automatic fingerprint verification systems against hill-
climbing and brute-force attacks. We compare the perfor-
mance of this type of attacks against two different minutiae-
based systems, the NIST Fingerprint Image Software 2
(NFIS2) reference system and a Match-on-Card based sys-
tem. In order to study their success rate, the attacks are
analyzed and modified in each scenario. We focus on the
influence of initial conditions in hill-climbing attacks, like
the number of minutiae in the synthetically generated tem-
plates or the performance of each type of modification in the
template. We demonstrate how slight modifications in the
hill-climbing algorithm lead to very different success rates.
1. Introduction
Biometrics is becoming an important issue in our society
[1]. The heightened interest in biometrics-based automated
personal identification has resulted in the development of
several commercial biometric recognition systems. Finger-
prints are one of the most commonly used biometrics due
to their reduced size and acceptability [2]. Despite the de-
velopment of fingerprint recognition techniques, there are
many security concerns [3] which still make it a topic for
discussion.
One of the hot topics within biometrics are Match-on-
Devices, and in particular Match-on-Card based systems for
fingerprint recognition. Smart-cards allow to encrypt and
protect stored information and to execute matching algo-
rithms [4]. Thus, the user’s fingerprint template and the
matching algorithm can be stored in a smart-card with-
out compromising its security. Corroborating this increas-
ing interest in Match-on-Card systems, in the Fingerprint
Verification Competition (FVC) 2004 [5], a special eval-
uation track for matching systems with reduced time and
memory restrictions was introduced. Furthermore, in this
year’s competition, FVC 2006 [6], a new category includ-
ing Match-on-Card systems has been proposed.
A fingerprint recognition system is vulnerable to attacks
which may decrease its security level. Ratha et al. [7] have
studied and classified these attacks in 8 different types. At-
tacks from type 1 are aimed at the sensor and can be carried
out using fake fingerprints. Types 3, 5 and 6 may be per-
formed as Trojan Horse attacks, bypassing the feature ex-
tractor, the matcher, and the system database respectively.
Types 2, 4, 7 and 8 attack communication channels and can
either try to intercept information or insert it into the chan-
nel. Possible attack points in a general biometric recogni-
tion system are depicted in Fig. 1.
In this study, we focus on attacks known as hill-climbing
attacks [8]. Hill-climbing attacks consist of an application
that sends synthetically generated minutiae templates to the
matcher and, according to the match score, randomly mod-
ifies the templates until the decision threshold is exceeded.
We implement hill-climbing attacks against both the NFIS2
reference system [9] and a Match-on-Card (MoC) system,
and then study some factors involved in the success rate of
the attack. A direct comparison is also made between our
hill-climbing attacks and brute-force attacks.
Using smart-card embedded matching systems for fin-
gerprint recognition has already been studied [4, 10] but, to
the best of our knowledge, no attacks aimed directly to the
smart-card matcher have been reported in the literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Hill-
climbing and brute force attacks are explained in Sect. 2, the
fingerprint recognition systems under attack are presented
in Sect. 3, experiments are described in Sect. 4, and conclu-
sions are finally drawn in Sect. 5.
2. Hill-climbing and Brute-Force Attacks
Hill-climbing attacks against automated fingerprint
recognition systems have been studied by Uludag and Jain
[8] and Soutar [12]. A hill-climbing attack may be per-
formed by an application that sends random templates to
the system, which are perturbed iteratively. The applica-
tion reads the output match score and continues with the
perturbed template only when the matching score increases
until the decision threshold is exceeded.
A hill-climbing attack may be of type 2 or 4, depend-
ing on the point of attack. Soutar proposed in [12] a type
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Figure 1. Architecture and dataflow paths of an automated biometric verification system. Possible
attack points are numbered from 1 to 8.
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Figure 2. Architecture, dataflow paths and point of attack of the NFIS2 system.
2 attack with a face recognition system. The input image is
conveniently modified until a desired matching score is at-
tained. In [8], a type 4 attack against a minutiae-based fin-
gerprint recognition system is described. Uludag and Jain
[8] propose an attack based on synthetic random minutiae
templates which are modified, one minutia at a time, until
the decision threshold is exceeded.
In this paper, we study a hill-climbing attack based on the
one presented by Uludag and Jain [8]. The template format
of the matching systems must be known by the attacker as
well as the input image size. Note that the image size is
easy to obtain in general as it is normally made public by
the fingerprint sensor vendors.
The efficiency of a hill-climbing attack may be evalu-
ated by comparing the mean number of iterations needed to
break each user account with the estimated number of at-
tempts a brute-force attack would require [8]. The average
number of attempts needed by a brute-force attack can be
derived from the FAR of the system. A type 4 brute-force
attack may be performed by sending real minutiae templates
to the matcher until the system wrongly accepts one as cor-
responding to the template from the user’s account under
attack. Note that a brute-force attack using random syn-
thetic templates would need more iterations than the num-
ber derived from the FAR as the FAR is calculated using real
minutiae templates as inputs, not synthetic random ones.
3. Fingerprint Matching Systems
3.1. Reference System
We use the minutiae-based verification system from the
NIST Fingerprint Image Software package (NFIS2) [9] as
a reference system for our attacks. The architecture of the
system and the point of attack, where the synthetic tem-
plates shall be introduced, are depicted in Fig. 2.
NFIS2 is a PC-based fingerprint processing and recogni-
tion system composed of independent software modules. In
our experiments we will use two of the software modules in-
cluded in NFIS2: MINDTCT and BOZORTH3. MINDTCT
is the minutiae extraction subsystem. It generates an output
text file containing the location, orientation and quality of
each minutia from a fingerprint image input file. Direction
maps and quality maps, among other output files are also
generated for each image file.
BOZORTH3 performs the matching between any num-
ber of fingerprint templates which must have the same for-
mat as the output of MINDTCT. It is a rotation and transla-
tion invariant algorithm since it computes only relative dis-
tances and orientations. BOZORTH3 first constructs intra-
compatibility tables, which are lists of associations between
pairs of minutiae and their relative distance from the same
fingerprint. It then looks for potential compatible minutiae
pairs from the two fingerprints based on a specified toler-
ance and stores them in an inter-compatibility table. In the
last step, it first traverses the inter-compatibility table, com-
bining its entries into clusters, and then combines the clus-
ters, building graphs. The larger the graph, the larger the
match score will be. In our system, the match score is not
normalized.
3.2. Match-on-Card (MoC) System
The Match-on-Card (MoC) system under consideration
is a proprietary prototype. The matcher is fully embedded
in a smart-card and may only be accessed via a smart-card
reader connected to a PC.
One of the main differences between this system and the
Figure 3. Top: Digital Persona fingerprint sen-
sor used for acquiring the fingerprints used in
our experiment [11]. Bottom: Smart-card and
smart-card reader used in our experiments.
reference system explained in Sect. 3.1 is that a MoC sys-
tem is hardware limited. A smart-card has a very limited
processing capacity and the matching algorithm should be
efficient enough to perform the match in a reasonably short
time. There has been much work in this field resulting in
many algorithm proposals which try to reduce the matching
computational cost [4, 10, 13]. The MoC system used in
our experiments is shown in Fig. 3.
The smart-card reader is attached to a PC via USB, so
the attacks can be performed from the PC. The user’s fin-
gerprint template is also stored in the smart-card memory.
We only know the template storing format, which is also
minutiae-based. In our experiments, we use the NFIS2
MINTDCT module (see Sect. 3.1) for the minutiae extrac-
tion phase and then perform the required transformations to
the output file to make it compatible with this system. Note
that the minutiae extraction phase would never be carried
out by the smart-card, it must be done by an external appli-
cation. The matcher returns the score as an integer value in
a range from 0 to 100, 100 being the maximum likelihood
between both fingerprints. The matching algorithm is un-
known, but as the template format and the matching score
are accessible, a hill-climbing attack may be performed.
Figure 4. Minutiae location histogram from
the selected subcorpus of MCYT [11]
4. Experiments
4.1. Database
The attack algorithms presented above have been tested
on a sub-corpus from the MCYT database [11]. The fin-
gerprint images are acquired with a 500 dpi optical sensor,
model UareU by Digital Persona (see Fig. 3). We con-
sider 10 samples from the right and left index fingers of
75 users, with 6 samples acquired with a high level of con-
trol [11] (i.e. small rotation or displacement from the cen-
ter of the sensor), 2 with medium control level, and the
last 2 samples with low control level. Therefore there are
75× 2× 10 = 1500 samples.
We compute the two-dimensional histogram of the minu-
tia locations of all the fingerprints of the considered sub-
corpus. Fig. 4 depicts this histogram and a rectangle ob-
tained heuristically that contains most minutiae. It can be
seen that there are nearly no minutiae outside an elliptic re-
gion. Minutiae are nearly uniformly distributed in the rec-
tangle with a higher concentration at its center. This rec-
tangle will be used in our hill-climbing attacks as explained
in Sect. 4.2. In the selected sub-corpus from the database
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Figure 5. Verification performance of both systems
described in Sect. 4.1, the mean number of minutiae is 38.
The verification performance of both systems is also
studied. We use one of the low control samples as a tem-
plate and the other 9 samples from the same finger as probes
to test genuine matches, leading to 150×9 = 1350 genuine
user scores. Impostor scores are obtained comparing each
template to one sample from each other finger of the sub-
corpus, thus we have 150 × 149 = 22350 impostor scores.
Fig. 5 depicts the FA, FR and DET curves from both sys-
tems.
4.2. Experimental Protocol
Our experiments are based on the ones presented in [8].
A number of 100 initial synthetic random templates are gen-
erated and sent to the matcher to attack a specific user ac-
count. Synthetic templates are generated with a fixed num-
ber of minutiae which is the mean number of minutiae in
the fingerprints from the database (25 in [8]) and dividing
the template into 9 × 9 pixel cells. A cell can contain only
one minutia to avoid generating minutia which are closer
than the inter-ridge distance.
The template that attains the highest matching score is
saved. This template is iteratively modified by:
a) Perturbing an existing minutia by moving it to an
adjacent cell or by changing its orientation.
b) Adding a minutia.
c) Substituting a minutia.
d) Deleting a minutia from the template.
If the matching score increases in any of these iterations,
the modified template is saved, otherwise it is not.
In our experiments, we study the effects of different at-
tack parameters by observing which iterations achieve, on
average, more matching score increases during the attacks.
We also study the influence of the initial number of minu-
tiae and how these can be generated to improve the perfor-
ROI Iterations Initial Mean score raises Success Total accounts brokenMinutiae a b c d Rate in 5000 iterations
No a, b, c, d 38 1,87 5,16 6,13 0,90 2/150 64/150
Yes a, b, c, d 38 2,41 4,93 5,60 1,35 7/150 85/150
(a) Hill-climbing statistics using all iterations with and without ROI.
ROI Iterations Initial Mean score raises Success Total accounts brokenMinutiae a b c d Rate in 5000 iterations
Yes a, b, c, d 38 2,41 4,93 5,60 1,35 7/150 85/150
Yes a, b, c 38 3,18 7,70 7,91 - 28/150 145/150
Yes b, c 38 - 9,25 9,76 - 40/150 143/150
(b) Hill-climbing statistics deleting low performing iterations.
ROI Iterations Initial Mean score raises Success Total accounts brokenMinutiae a b c d Rate in 5000 iterations
Yes b, c 25 - 10,85 8,95 - 28/150 136/150
Yes b, c 38 - 9,25 9,76 - 40/150 143/150
Yes b, c 55 - 5,68 13,67 - 12/150 132/150
(c) Hill-climbing statistics using a different number of initial minutiae.
Table 1. Hill-climbing results on NFIS2
ROI Iterations Initial Mean score raises Success Total accounts brokenMinutiae a b c d Rate in 5000 iterations
Yes b, c 10 - 7,70 5,30 - 65/150 133/150
Yes b, c 25 - 5,53 10,08 - 123/150 146/150
Yes b, c 38 - 3,55 13,27 - 78/150 139/150
(a) Hill-climbing statistics using a different number of initial minutiae.
ROI Iterations Initial Mean score raises Success Total accounts brokenMinutiae a b c d Rate in 5000 iterations
Yes a, b, c, d 25 1,22 4,60 5,71 4,68 52/150 132/150
Yes b, c, d 25 - 5,24 5,98 5,03 79/150 138/150
Yes b, c 25 - 5,53 10,08 - 123/150 146/150
(b) Hill-climbing statistics deleting low performing iterations.
ROI Iterations Initial Mean score raises Success Total accounts brokenMinutiae a b c d Rate in 5000 iterations
Yes b, c 25 - 5,33 10,08 - 123/150 146/150
No b, c 25 - 6,13 9,15 - 91/150 148/150
(c) Hill-climbing statistics with and without rectangular ROI.
Table 2. Hill-climbing results on the Match-on-Card system
mance of our attacks. A first attack will be performed using
the mean number of minutiae in our database and the four
types of iterations.
In each attack, the 150 user templates are attacked using
the same method (same initial minutiae generating scheme,
same type of iterations and decision point) and statistics are
gathered about the success rate of the attack. According to
the results, the attacks are modified in order to better under-
stand the factors involved in the success rate.
The synthetically generated templates will first have
a random uniform minutiae distribution of 38 minutiae,
which is the mean number of minutiae in our database.
For the NFIS2 system, we choose a decision threshold of
35 for the match score, leading to a 0.10% FAR and a 3.33%
FRR. This means that a brute-force attack would theoreti-
cally need an average of 1000 iterations. For the Match-on-
Card system a decision threshold of 55 is selected, resulting
in a FAR of approximately 0.16% and a FRR of 17.33%.
Thus, for the MoC system, 640 iterations would be needed
by a brute-force attack.
We define the success-rate of an attack as the proportion
of fingerprints for which the decision threshold is reached
using less iterations than a brute-force attack. We establish
a maximum of 5000 and 2000 iterations for the NFIS2 and
the MoC system respectively.
4.3. Experimental Results
We first attack the NFIS2 system using the method
described in [8]. As it has been said in Sect. 4.1, there is
a region where it is most probable to find minutiae. From
now on, we will refer to this region as the Region Of Inter-
est (ROI). We subsequently run the algorithm considering
only minutiae in the inside of the ROI, i.e. without gen-
erating, adding or displacing any minutia outside the ROI.
Table 1.(a) studies the introduction of the ROI in the basic
configuration of the attack, showing an improvement in the
attack success rate when considering minutiae only within
the ROI (from 2/150 to 7/150).
Next we focus on the influence of the different types of
iterations. As it can be seen in Table 1.(a), each type of
iteration achieves a different mean number of score raises
during the attacks. Table 1.(b) shows the success improve-
ments using only the best performing iterations. Iterations
b and c, (add and substitute a minutia respectively) are the
ones which achieve a higher rate of score raises, achieving
a success rate of 40/150.
Finally, for the NFIS2 system, we study how the initial
number of minutiae in the 100 synthetic initial random tem-
plates affect the attack performance. Table 1.(c) shows the
different success rates for three different initial configura-
tions. It can be seen that attacks with a number of ini-
tial minutiae different to the average in the database (38 in
our case) perform much worse than those with this average
number of initial minutiae. Fig. 6 shows the score progres-
sion and the minutiae maps of a successful hill-climbing
attack on NFIS2 while Fig. 7 shows the same data for an
unsuccessful attack.
For the Match-On-Card system, we start with the best
configuration obtained by the NFIS2 system. We first study
the influence of the initial number of minutiae, see Ta-
ble 2.(a). As it can be seen, 25 initial minutia achieve better
results (success rate of 123/150) than the mean number of
minutiae (success rate of 78/150). This may be an effect of
the limited capacity of the MoC matching algorithm.
In the next experiment, we study the influence of each
iteration. Table 2.b shows the results obtained. Again, as
on the NFIS2 system, iterations b and c are the most effec-
tive ones. The poor performance of iteration a points out
that the MoC system is not very sensitive to small minutiae
displacements or rotations. The attack score progression
and the minutiae maps of a successful attack are depicted
Fig. 8. The same data same data for an unsuccessful attack
is shown in Fig. 9.
Finally we study the relevance of using the ROI under
this configuration. In Table 2.(c) we see the decrease in per-
formance without using the ROI (from 123/150 to 91/150
success rate).
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we have performed and studied hill-
climbing attacks on the NFIS2 reference system and a
Match-on-Card embedded system. NFIS2 is a PC-based
fingerprint recognition system while the MoC system is a
hardware limited system.
As it has been shown, the performance of hill-climbing
attacks is heavily dependent upon the system under attack
and the iterations that are performed. Attacks with a re-
duced number of minutiae are highly successful against the
MoC system, while their performance against NFIS2 is very
poor.
NFIS2 has proven to be more robust against hill-
climbing attacks, at least with a reduced number of itera-
tions. On the other hand, if we allow for a higher number
of iterations (such as 5000 in our experiments), most ac-
counts can be broken. It may be derived from the results
that hill-climbing attacks are less effective than brute-force
attacks, at least in the case of NFIS2. This statement must
be taken with care, as hill-climbing attacks require much
less resources than the ones needed by a brute-force attack.
In fact, to perform an efficient brute force attack, the at-
tacker must have a database of more than a thousand of real
fingerprint templates, whereas there is no need for real tem-
plates in the case of a hill-climbing attack.
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Figure 6. (a) Score progression, (b) original fingerprint minutiae, and (c) original minutiae (black
circles) vs. synthetic minutiae (grey triangles) that achieve a higher score than the decision point on
NFIS2 in a relatively short attack
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Figure 7. (a) Score progression, (b) original fingerprint minutiae, and (c) original minutiae (black
circles) vs. synthetic minutiae (grey triangles) after 5000 iterations on NFIS2 in an unsuccessful
attack
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Figure 8. (a) Score progression, (b) original fingerprint minutiae, and (c) original minutiae (black
circles) vs. synthetic minutiae (grey triangles) that achieve a higher score than the decision point on
the MoC system in a relatively short attack
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Figure 9. (a) Score progression, (b) original fingerprint minutiae, and (c) original minutiae (black
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